The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) obligates states to "take steps individually and through international assistance and co-operation . .. to the maximum of [their] available resources" to realize the right to health. This obligation, however, is often dismissed because (1) realizing rights through "international assistance" is thought to intrude on state sovereignty and (2) it is impossible to say what is demanded by the "maximum of . . . available resources." These problems can be circumvented by "reading down" the mutual assistance clause, so that it demands only that steps be taken on a state's own territory, with its pecuniary resources. Industrialized states could use public funds to research diseases such as malaria, AIDS, and tuberculosis, but they have failed to consider their ICESCR obligations in making science funding decisions. These failures point to ubiquitous and grievous violations of international law.
The magnitude of the inequity, coupled with the prejudice this causes to people's lives, suggests that health research should be a human rights issue of the highest priority.
The thesis of this article is to argue that the right to health, which is recognized in international law, obliges states to readjust their scientific research priorities and funding to address more equitably the diseases of the developing world. The argument is conducted in three parts. First, I consider the legal sources of a right to health and argue that state obligations respecting that right must be construed transnationally, so that the beneficiaries of the right include nationals of foreign states. Second, I discuss a few methods to measure states' compliance with their international obligations respecting health. Third, I apply these methods to query the adequacy of states' research programs and budgets dedicated to diseases of the developing world. I conclude that in managing their scientific research priorities, states give outrageously little consideration to their obligations under international law.
State Obligations Respecting Health: For Whom?
There is in international law a little-noticed right to health. Neither academics nor states have weighed the right with the consideration it deserves, and accordingly some effort must be spent merely to rescue the right from the obscurity into which it has slid. This is surprising, as the right inhabits some of the best known human rights treaties, and an entire United Nations body, the World Health Organization, is dedicated to the effective and equitable provision of HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 health, which is in substance the raison d'etre of the right.
As with many rights, the right to health is formulated somewhat differently in each of the treaties in which it appears. As a least common denominator, these always declare that a person is entitled to certain fundamentals which are essential to health. In better-developed codifications this entitlement is elaborated on in a normative or quasi-legislative sense, so that it becomes possible to discern not only the bare entitlement, but the cognate obligations that states undertake to realize health rights for all.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights first articulated a right to health.8 It reads, at Article 25:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.... This language is typical of the Declaration in that it is no more than exhortatory. Notably, it creates a right, appertaining to "everyone," that is not supported by a corresponding governmental obligation of any sort.9 Despite this omission, the Declaration does have some legal effect as a source of moral authority, and it has been cited approvingly in municipal law.'0 But laudable as that may be, the Declaration lacks the normativity that would answer the question, "What exactly is the right to health, and who is its proponent?" The Declaration merely avers states' aspirations (taken with varying degrees of sincerity) to provide every person with, inter alia, a decently endowed, salubrious standard of living. It decidedly does not say that a state will be judged, much less taken to task, for failing to make it so."
The creation of state obligations at a global level in any meaningful sense waited nearly another two decades for the codification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).12,13 It has been accurately said that the Covenants "together legislate essentially what the Universal Declaration had declared."''4 Both are widely subscribed to, and as such the rights they enshrine are at the heart of international human rights law.'5
The Covenants were created to inject some normativity into the exhortatory rights of the Declaration.16 Among the international instruments that create a right to health, the ICESCR contains the most substantive content, in Article 12.17 That article proclaims the right, establishes a standard to which it will be realized, and lists the steps to be taken by states in its furtherance: This is all striking language, and it must be carefully dissected before considering whether its meaning is consonant with the rest of the ICESCR and the interpretation the ICESCR has elsewhere received.
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The Article 12 right is tremendously ambitious in scope. It provides that the right to health inures to "everyone" and that everyone should enjoy the "highest attainable standard" of well-being. No other right in the ICESCR is framed in such superlative language. Article 7, which protects workers' rights, only aspires to creating "just and favourable conditions of work." Even Article 1 1, which protects rights related to quality of life, aims no higher than "an adequate standard of living ... including adequate food, clothing and housing."
The top billing that the right to health enjoys in the ICESCR makes sense when one considers the centrality of health to civil society: no state has achieved prosperity and greatness on the backs of an ailing populace. There is a horizontal and mutual relationship between the state of a citizenry's health and the prosperity of a society or state, and a sickly people are simultaneously causal and symptomatic of an infirm state.'8 The unity of this nexus is recognized by the obligation on states in Article 12.2.c to take preventative steps in addressing disease. It is echoed again in singling out infant and child health for protection in Article 12.2.a-a matter so imperative that a state failing this obligation endangers not so much its social fabric as its fiber.
It is hard to overstate how terribly useful these obligations would be in grappling with real world diseases, if only they were taken seriously by states. Take the case of malaria: It is an endemic scourge of most tropical nations, is rarely fatal except where medical services are grossly inadequate, is lethal to children far more frequently than adults, and is undeniably better prevented than cured. It is therefore tempting to consider what reliance the people of the world, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of a right to health, may place on state obligations.
But where the attainment of obligations necessitates the disposition of a state's carefully husbanded resources, legal questions invariably arise. Two such questions readily come to mind. The first is to whom in particular do states owe their ICESCR obligations? States have their allies and foes, and some recipients can be more palatable than others. The second is to what extent do these obligations make demands on a state's resources: will the state only have to make certain of its resources available, such as its biomedical research budget, or will it have to marshal every resource it can reasonably muster? The answer to the first question necessitates a wide look at the construction of the ICESCR and the principle of state sovereignty. And the second question, which is less clear-cut, touches on ideas of distributive justice between the South and the North. Both questions are diabolically contentious, and therefore exciting.
Are States Obliged to Promote Health Abroad?
International law, once a strict "law of states," has in this century grown to accommodate "natural people" as subjects with rights of their own.'9 Yet it remains a live question whether international law can oblige a state to act positively for the benefit of aliens in a different state's territorial juris-diction. The fulfillment of such transnational obligations seems likely to offend the principle of state sovereignty, and there is an awkward problem in reconciling tensions between these two concerns. The problem comes up, inevitably, in interpreting the scope of state obligations under the ICESCR.
On its face, the ICESCR seems to indicate that states do owe obligations to aliens abroad. Consider Article 2 of the treaty, which discusses, inter alia, "international assistance": 2.1. Each State Party of the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
The States
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
The language of "international assistance and co-operation" is not included gratuitously in the ICESCR. It is, rather, a meaningful affirmation that a state must not treat Covenant rights autonomously: in pledging to undertake steps for the "full realization" of Covenant rights, a state is bound to do so both at home and abroad.20 Where Covenant rights inure to individuals (recall that the Article 12 right to health inures to "everyone"), the undertaking to assist internationally touches on aliens outside a state's jurisdiction. Notably, the exceptions are in the provision of financial aid for promoting health and other aspects of general welfare!24 That states do routinely finance foreign projects for those purposes is a trite fact of state practice.25 For instance, each year donor states plan how much they shall disburse abroad in health aid; this information is then shared with recipient states, who budget that same amount as revenue for their domestic health budgets.26 With coordinated practices such as this, one could almost be forgiven for thinking that ongoing foreign aid disbursals are not so much ex gratia as tacit acceptance of a duty to assist internationally.
Finally, there may be categories of international assistance even less contentious than foreign aid, because they avoid Henkin's "state system" problem altogether: consider works or projects carried out entirely within a state's own jurisdiction for the benefit of another state. A theoretical example may be if a donor state undertook a research program on a problem of particular interest to a recipient state, so as to aid the latter in the progressive realization of a Covenant right.27 Provided that such a research program were executed entirely domestically, there could be no question of offending the recipient state's sovereignty.28
Because science is a shared endeavor, a res communis, it can easily happen that research done in one country may flow to the benefit of another, including, inter alia, research aimed at "the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases."29 In particular, biomedical and public health research can offer a convenient means for a state to realize the advancement of health rights in another state, consistent with its obligations under the ICESCR. The fruits of such research may include new interventions, such as treatments or prophylactic measures, or improved protocols for delivering existing interventions, for instance by making a treatment more effective or affordable. There is even support within the ICESCR for scientific research to serve such ends: Article 15.1 .b enshrines a "right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications." Also, Article 23 mentions that "the furnishing of technical assistance" shall be among the actions states take internationally to achieve Covenant rights. Other UN documents contain similar language.30
To summarize, in the contentious question of whether the ICESCR obliges states to progressively realize Covenant rights for aliens outside the state's jurisdiction, the answer is clearly yes, providing that state sovereignty is respected. This is certainly the case where the resources and management employed to meet the international obligation are wholly domestic and located in the donor state. A state's control over its own domestic scientific research program is an example of such a case.
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How Intrusive Will the Fulfillment of ICESCR Obligations Be?
If there is a weakness in the ICESCR on which commentators agree, it is the wording of the so-called "resource phrase" in Article 2.1, which requires that a State Party undertake obligations "to a maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively . .. the rights recognized in the present Covenant." It is a maddeningly ambiguous phrase, and it unhappily inhabits one of the most important parts of the treaty. One writer has expressed his frustration with it this way:
It is a difficult phrase-two warring adjectives describing an undefined noun. "Maximum" stands for idealism; "available" stands for reality. "Maximum" is the sword of human rights rhetoric; "available" is the wiggle room for the state.31
To which one might properly add, "what is a resource, anyway?" The trouble is that, depending on the meaning one ascribes to the resource phrase, the ICESCR is either a compelling document or a vague paper lion amenable to state evasion.
Treaty language such as the resource phrase does not arise without a reason; indeed, the travaux preparatoires reveal a long and baroque struggle in its drafting.32 Various linguistic interpretations of the resource phrase have been advanced, ranging from the optimistic to the dismissive and even the rabid.333435 If we are to be pragmatic and judge by what the treaty has wrought since it came into force, then it seems the vagueness of the resource phrase has gone a long way toward paralyzing the treaty. But even that realization need not rob the phrase of its evocation of distributive justice-a result that the drafters of the treaty, speaking through the travaux, undoubtedly set out to achieve.36 To now salvage a workable meaning out of the vagueness would, in fact, give belated effect to the treaty's intentions. How best to do so? A corollary to there being an eluctable meaning to the phrase is that there must be a practicable way of measuring a state's compliance with its obligations under the treaty. By concentrating on measuring compliance, the meaning of the phrase itself can usefully be brought into focus. After all, of 36 Vol. Attractive as this sounds, measuring compliance is an onerous task in itself. It is, inevitably, about the state's discretionary use of resources, and states bluster when asked too pointedly to justify their resource use. Nor has the problem of compliance measurement received the attention it deserves from writers.37 Robert Robertson, who has considered it most thoroughly, believes that compliance monitoring cannot prescribe which resources are relevant to the measurement, but can at best suggest which resources, among several, may be relevant. He proposes five categories of resources: human, technological, informational, natural, and financial. Robertson argues that compliance measurement must particularize the kinds of resources evaluated to the Covenant right in question, for the reason that the realization of different Covenant rights will present different resource needs. Consequently, compliance measurement requires an exercise of discretion in deciding which kinds of resources are relevant to the Covenant right in question; and it is the sum of resources of the chosen kinds that indicates whether a state is complying with its ICESCR obligations.38 But this kind of proposal is largely tautologous with the problem of vagueness: there could be endless and paralyzing debate about which resources are germane to compliance measurement and which are extraneous.39 However sensible Robertson's approach is, it risks merely substituting one sort of disagreement for another.
One solution to this problem is to "read down" and simplify how we measure compliance-and, by extension, the meaning of the phrase itself. Where the travaux or academic writers make it clear that some kind of resource is admissible and thus "part of the story" in measuring state compliance, we may try to rely on that kind of resource exclusively, making it the whole story. Of course, this will not always be a reasonable simplification, but where it is at least tolerable there will be two practical advantages.40 First, debate over the kinds of resources relevant to compliance measurement is done away with. Second, and more importantly, by looking at only a single kind of resource, we systematically underestimate what a wealthy state could contribute in assisting a poorer state to realize its Covenant rights. If it turns out that the wealthy state's contributions are stingy even in the light of this simplification, then the wealthy state would be prima facie in default of its ICESCR obligations.4' Admittedly, this reading-down strategy deprives the ICESCR of its fullest expression and application, but it does clarify the treaty's normative value, and that makes it attractively easy to spot egregious defaulters.
Given the above proposal, it is helpful to consider the discussions on the resource phrase in the travaux as an indication of the kinds of resources that may speak to compliance measurement. Surprisingly, delegates from both industrialized and developing countries expressed the opinion that in ascertaining "available resources," it would be permissible to look at, and even beyond, government expenditures and budgets. 
Benchmarking Distributive Justice in Biomedical Research
Once we have elected to judge compliance in the light of public research budgets, the question arises for developed states of how much to fund research benefiting the state's own population, as against research primarily or exclusively benefiting the populations of developing states (herein after "foreign priority research"). In other words, of all that a state spends to realize the right to health, how much shall be spent to realize that right at home, and how much shall be spent to do so in developing countries via research? That, in a nutshell, is the essence of the distributive question.
Robertson has proposed several ways to benchmark domestic progress toward Covenant rights, but has not considered the related issue of distributive fairness and benchmarking progress toward the international realization of Covenant rights.50 In this section, I will consider some strategies for benchmarking, including both elaborations of Robertson's methods and novel approaches. Where possible, I will apply these strategies to the available data on research funding in diseases of special interest to the developing world.
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Subjective Reasonableness
One way to measure a state's compliance is to judge the adequacy of its funding on a particular biomedical research problem as against its own recognition of the imperativeness of the problem. In other words, the level of funding allocated to foreign priority research ought to be commensurate with a state's subjective assessment of the gravity of a situation inimical to the right to health. That assessment may be produced either by the state itself or by another party such as an expert international agency, providing it is endorsed in the result by the state. When the state funds foreign priority research at a level that is unreasonably low in the light of its own assessment of the gravity of a threat to health, it is unlikely to be meeting its ICESCR obligations.
The AIDS crisis provides an example. Nobody doubts the severity of the AIDS problem, and for good reason. Some of the numbers are staggering. A disease unknown before 1981 became, by 1990, the 28th most serious contributor globally to preventable death and disease. This conflagration of accelerating infectivity is expected to continue until sometime early in the next decade, when the incidence of HIV infection is expected to drop. By that time, AIDS will probably be among the top 10 causes of death and disability. It will probably still be in the top 10 in 2020.11 It blights industrialized and developing countries alike. In the United States, AIDS is the leading cause of death among those between the ages of 25 and 44, and in Uganda, as much as 8 % of the population may be HIV-positive, explaining why in many parts of the country AIDS is the most common cause of hospital admissions and deaths.52'53
In view of all that, it is unsurprising that states count AIDS among their paramount public health concerns. That is evidenced by the lavish funding developed states give AIDS research programs in relation to the present-day incidence of the disease. Indeed, one can be forgiven for supposing that funding bodies may be overreacting to AIDS. Robert Livingston, chair of the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, has said, "We spend $295 per patient on cancer research, $93 on heart disease, $54 on Alzheimer's, $26 on Parkinson's-and $36,000 per AIDS patient on research."54 AIDS research has been, and remains, a 40 Vol. What must be appreciated is that the AIDS problem in the developing world is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from that of the developed world. In quantity, it is tremendously more severe. Estimates vary, but a recent UNAIDS estimate is typical in concluding that "of the 21 million people infected with HIV around the world, 94 % live in developing countries."57 In quality, the problem is genetically distinct, and different viral subtypes are prevalent in different parts of the world. An HIV-positive African, for instance, is unlikely to carry a virus of the same subtype as that afflicting a North American patient.58 These different subtypes possess certain unique immunological properties. As a result, it probably will be necessary to research the basic immunology and molecular genetics of the particular subtype for which one ultimately hopes to produce a vaccine.59 Research aimed at developing a North American vaccine, while advancing the field as a whole, is by no means assured to bring us nearer to a vaccine suitable for Africa.
When the AIDS problem of the developing world is correctly recognized as distinct, necessitating research in its own right, the research priorities of developed countries appear parsimonious almost beyond belief. Multidrug treatment, the much hyped development of the 1996 International Conference on AIDS, is now a richly-funded, booming topic of research.60 It is also an enterprise of zero usefulness to the developing world.6' A multidrug "cocktail" of three anti-HIV pharmaceuticals costs about $15,000 per year-many times the per capita GDP of developing nations!62 For that reason, a fonder wish of developing states is that a HIV vaccine will soon be developed that can help them. But that is unlikely for the foregoing reasons, despite increases to AIDS research Given the ready availability of research funds for AIDS and asthma, but not for a matter exclusively of foreign priority research, it is impossible that, as far as malaria is concerned, the Covenant right to health is being progressively realized sufficiently by any state.90
Decision-Making
The foregoing examples illustrate that states can and often do arrive at funding decisions that fail to effectuate their obligation to realize Covenant rights. These failures may arise either independently or as the result of systematic lacunae in the allocation of research funding. The interesting question therefore arises of whether the process by which research funding decisions are made takes account of a state's ICESCR obligations. A decision-making process that gives weight to ICESCR obligations is, at very least, indicative of a state's willingness to progressively realize Covenant rights, if not quite a measure of compliance.
To answer this, it is necessary to relate in rough sketch the process by which scientific research comes to be publicly funded.91 The process begins when a scientist writes a project proposal comprising the subject and goal of the research to be undertaken, the experimental strategies that will be used to reach the goal, and a budget for the human and technical resources that will be required. The scientist then submits the proposal as the central part of an larger application to the appropriate research program(s) of the state funding body. The proposal undergoes peer review, a process by which scientists expert in the field consider the proposal's merit along with competing proposals and award a rating accordingly. In general, only proposals which are judged scientifically and ethically sound, technically feasible, responsive to the trends HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 45 in the field, and consonant with the mandate of the research program garner a favorable rating and become eligible for funds. The separation of the rating decision from the disbursal decision can produce harsh results. Competing demands from other highly rated proposals generally mean that projects must be funded at a level less than that requested by the researcher-and that is true for the lucky ones. It is not at all uncommon for outstanding, "alpha-rated" projects to go entirely unfunded.
In a scheme such as this, it would be quite feasible to introduce a requirement that ICESCR obligations be considered as one factor in the making of the funding decision. The most far-reaching (but most costly) way to institute this change would be for states to create and endow dedicated research programs, aimed exclusively or primarily at funding foreign priority research. If funds were earmarked in this way, it would give scientists a powerful incentive to propose new projects or reorient existing ones in order to become eligible for the funds. Rather automatically, scientists would become allied to the state's endeavors in realizing ICESCR obligations abroad or, for that matter, domestically.
At present, where dedicated research programs exist, they are overwhelmingly dedicated to research problems of the developed world, an imbalance that mirrors the overall scarcity of funds for foreign priority research. were among the criteria used to guide national research priorities. Rather, the Commission was frequently told that the availability of funding was entirely merit-driven: if applicants put forward good and appropriate research proposals, the state would fund them.97 Such a passive approach evinces a weak hand in guiding science policy and orienting the state's research priorities, not to mention a feeble commitment to the state's international responsibilities. Yet it seems to be the rule among states, and perhaps worse, a rule in which their scientific establishments take pride.
Few unequivocal conclusions can be drawn about the decision-making processes of research funding in relation to state compliance with the ICESCR. The processes are not entirely transparent, especially at the peer review stage, and little information is available apart from the merely anecdotal. Yet even with so little to go on, it seems that the inequity of biomedical research is institutionally rooted, and that reform is needed in the processes by which funding bodies design research programs, solicit research proposals, and conduct peer reviews.
If states are to begin to fulfill their ICESCR obligations and animate the moribund right to health, it is in the halls of their science ministries that the work should begin. Sometimes working for change in the most unlikely places can bring profound results. The challenge for international human rights lawyers must be to throw their voices into the alien territory and culture of science to motivate that change.
17. Although more recent conventions on women and children, as well as the Alma-Ata Declaration, have elaborated the right to health with more precision, the normative language in the ICESCR, establishing an obligation on the part of signatories, is by far the strongest. 18. This is a tenet of international public health, and the literature is replete with examples of the linkage between economic ascendancy and public health. Generally, as a state's wealth increases, so does the health of its citizens. Conversely, preventable illness among its citizens can result in so great a cost to the state that economic development virtually ceases. For an excellent, and sometimes stunning, empirical account of these relationships, see the introductory chapters of Basch (note 2). , 1985) , pp. 36-52. 40. How reasonable the simplification is depends on whether the other kinds of resources, which we neglect in our compliance measurement, can be crudely deemed negligible. This determination, echoing Robertson, depends on the right in question. For instance, realizing the right to unionize (Article 8 of the ICESCR) probably takes significant human resources, no natural or technological resources, and modest informational and financial resources. It is crude, but not wholly unreasonable, to dismiss the latter two as negligible. Query, however, whether the breakdown of resource demands to realize a given right may not in fact change depending on which state is trying to realize the right, and whether it is doing so for its own nationals or those of another state. 41. The only plausible way the wealthy state could nevertheless be in compliance is if it were lavish in making available a different kind of resource, other than the one chosen for compliance measurement, for the realization of a Covenant right. In assessing that defense, it would be proper to price out the value of that different resource in market terms and credit
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